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NOTE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS: A PROPOSED
MIDDLE GROUND AFTER EXXON SHIPPING
CO. V. BAKER
Ryan J. Strasser*
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court expounded upon its punitive dam-
ages and substantive due process jurisprudence in Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that substantive due process
demands a 1:1 punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio cap in federal
maritime cases. The majority in Exxon was concerned about outlier ver-
dicts like the astronomical $5 billion punitive damages that the Exxon
jury returned. Meanwhile, the minority was concerned that the cap
stripped the jury of its function as spokesman of the community and that
the cap left no room for juries to punish truly heinous crimes more
harshly than less egregious acts. Could a middle ground possibly exist
between these two views? Borrowing from Colorado statutory law and
Arizona state court precedent, this Note argues that a 1:1 ratio cap
should apply to all federal cases in order to reduce the number of outlier
verdicts, but juries should have the power to overcome that cap if a
plaintiff can prove (1) beyond a reasonable doubt that (2) a defendant
acted with "an evil mind." Through the combined use of these two
heightened standards-each of which are already used individually by
some states, the Exxon minority's concerns about keeping the jury em-
powered would be alleviated, while still allowing the use of a ratio cap to
reign in outlier verdicts. In this way, there exists a middle ground after
Exxon.
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What is needed for punitive damages reform is a prudential
judgment of the appropriate cap or limit to punitive damages that will
allow some room for punishing egregious behavior but constrain the
deleterious effects of unlimited punitive damages judgments on
consumers.
- George L. Priest1
INTRODUCTION
Having just guzzled ten shots of liquor, Joseph Hazelwood, a life-
time alcoholic, boarded a ship as its captain at 9:12 p.m. 2 Shortly after
leaving port, Hazelwood realized that the boat was on course to collide
with an underwater coral reef.3 Despite becoming aware of this potential
hazard, Hazelwood sped up the boat and then abandoned his outdoor post
to do paperwork in his cabin down below, leaving two unlicensed crew
members to navigate around the reef.4 The crew members failed to prop-
erly make a turn, and, as a result, the ship ran aground on the reef, tear-
ing open the hull.5 Eleven million gallons of crude oil gushed into
Prince William Sound off the Alaskan Coast.6 During the follow-up in-
vestigation, authorities determined that at the time of the accident, Hazel-
wood had a blood-alcohol content of approximately .241, an amount
triple the legal limit at which a person can operate a motor vehicle in
most states today. 7 These are the facts of the Exxon Valdez oil spill that
occurred on March 23, 1989.8
The aftermath resulted in a significant financial loss for Exxon.9 In
all, the company spent more than $3.4 billion between cleanup efforts,
I George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REV.
825, 839 (1996).
2 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2612 (2008).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 2613.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 2612.
9 See id.
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fines, restitution, and voluntary settlements with various injured par-
ties. 10 The unsettled claims in the Exxon Valdez incident merged into a
single, massive case.1' At trial the jury returned a verdict finding both
Hazelwood and the corporation to have acted recklessly and awarded
$287 million in compensatory damages to the class of plaintiffs-com-
mercial fisherman whose industry had been wiped out by the oil spill.12
In the subsequent phase of the trial, the court investigated the actions and
omissions of Exxon officials leading up to the spill. 13 After reviewing
the evidence, the jury found Exxon liable for punitive damages in the
amount of $5 billion. 14
A figure as massive as $5 billion in punitive damages naturally
raises some eyebrows. 15 Because the U.S. Supreme Court had begun the
process of reforming the law of punitive damages while the Exxon litiga-
tion was playing out in the lower courts, the verdict had to repeatedly be
reviewed to ensure that it remained constitutional. 16 The Ninth Circuit
twice remanded the case back to the trial court for an award adjust-
ment. 17 Eventually, the Ninth Circuit took it upon itself to remit the
award to $2.5 billion. 18 The constant bouncing back and forth between
the district court and the Ninth Circuit kept the multi-billion dollar ver-
dict in the news for almost two decades. 19
Exxon was one of several cases that fueled the "tort reform" fire,
which became a hot-button political issue during the 1990s and 2000s.20
Awarding punitive damages has not always been commonplace in the
American civil justice system.2 1 In fact, prior to and during the first half
of the twentieth century, cases rarely resulted in an award of punitive
damages, which were reserved for exceptional cases. 22 This principle no
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2615.
13 Id. at 2614. The case was so complicated that the district court divided the litigation
into four phases. Id. at 2618 n.6.
14 Id.
15 See Jennifer Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Im-
plications for Reform, 50 BuFF. L. REV. 103, 126 (2002).
16 See In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Exxon Valdez, 239 F.3d
985 (9th Cir. 2001).
17 See In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Exxon Valdez, 239 F.3d
985 (9th Cir. 2001).
18 In re Exxon Valdez, 400 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
19 See Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 126 (explaining that the media overrepresents cases
involving products liability or medical malpractice, large damage awards, plaintiffs winning,
and awards that include a punitive component).
20 See, e.g., Bush Outlines Medical Liability Reform, CNN.coM, Jan. 16, 2003, http://
www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/16/bush.malpractice [hereinafter Medical Liability Re-
form] (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
21 See Priest, supra note 1, at 826-27.
22 See id.
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longer constitutes the general rule today.23 As a result, many want to
revert to the days when a claim for punitive damages was the exception,
not the expectation.24 These tort reformers have proposed many possible
reforms, including the following: (1) eliminating punitive damages alto-
gether, (2) taking the issue out of the hands of the jury and leaving it in
the hands of the judge, or (3) controlling the amount of punitive damages
awarded through a legislatively-devised statutory scheme. 25
The media's tendency to disproportionately report on verdicts that
arguably involve excessive punitive damage awards distorts the public's
perception of the way in which juries award punitive damages 26 and, to
some extent, catalyzes the tort reform movement. The movement places
much of the blame on the institution of the jury, and candidates for pub-
lic office seize the opportunity to make political headway by promising
institutional reform measures.27 Detractors of punitive damages point to
the award in Exxon as proof that juries cannot control their anger in
many cases, and, that as a result, they award excessively large punitive
damages.28
Such criticism is not altogether unwarranted. Cases like Exxon do
indeed present a very real problem, because defendants face the prospect
of having an "outlier jury" that will award damages grossly in excess of
the amount that anyone might have predicted them to award. When this
happens, defendants face the possibility of incurring insufferable puni-
tive damage awards that can completely bankrupt the entity. Fixing this
problem by having a judge determine punitive damages does not guaran-
tee better results. 29 Moreover, eliminating punitive damages altogether
is an overly drastic measure, given the unique ability of punitive dam-
ages to advance the important goals of retribution and deterrence in the
American civil justice system. Relying solely on an appellate court's use
of remittitur-the reduction of a jury damages award by a judge-to
reduce outlier verdicts is also problematic. 30 The remedy, then, seems to
23 See id.
24 See, e.g., The American Tort Reform Association Homepage, http://www.atra.org (last
visited Apr. 25, 2009).
25 See, e.g., Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U.
Cm-. L. REV. 179, 210 (1998) ("Judges are better suited than juries to give appropriate weight
to a defendant's finances.").
26 See Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 126 ("The information available in the media about
civil jury decision-making is not a representative sample of all civil litigation.").
27 See, e.g., Medical Liability Reform, supra note 20.
28 See John C. MacQueen & George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury
Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards
for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IowA L. REv. 1109, 1120 (1995).
29 David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1139, 1170 (2000) ("The most radical reform would be to dispense with the jury entirely
and to move toward judicial judgments .... ").
30 See MacQueen & Woodworth, supra note 28, at 1123; See also infra Part III.C.
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lie in exercising greater control over jury discretion, as it relates to
awarding damages. This Note will propose several reforms to craft such
a remedy.
Part I will present several factors that may lead a jury to render an
outlier verdict. Part II will consider the reasons that the U.S. Supreme
Court in Exxon chose to implement a 1:1 punitive-to-compensatory dam-
age ratio-cap in federal maritime claims as a means to rein in outlier
verdicts. Part III proposes that jurisdictions apply the 1:1 ratio-cap to all
claims for punitive damages as well but allow awards to exceed the cap
if a given plaintiff can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant acted with an "evil mind." These heightened standards present a
compromise between decreasing the number of outlier verdicts through a
ratio-cap and allowing the jury to maintain its power as a body represen-
tative of the community's sentiments.
I. FACTORS THAT MAY CAUSE JURIES TO RETURN OUTLIER VERDICTS
Multiple commentators have called for replacing juries with trial
judges as the arbiters on questions of whether to award punitive dam-
ages.31 Problems undoubtedly exist with allowing juries to award puni-
tive damages, but despite these problems, those commentators who call
for substituting judges for jurors in punitive damages matters go too far.
The problems with the current system may explain what triggers a jury to
return an apparently excessive verdict, but these problems do not -indi-
vidually or in the aggregate-demand taking away this function from the
jury altogether. Instead, the problems with the current system counsel in
favor of reforms that will rein in some of the unbridled discretion that
jurors currently possess in the area of returning damage awards.
Juries are inherently deliberative bodies. 32 While deliberations may
strengthen a jury's ability to reach accurate decisions on questions of
fact, they may also increase the risk of unpredictable and erratic dollar
verdicts.33 Professor David Schkade and his colleagues argue that jurors
are quite competent when it comes to placing a defendant's conduct on a
"punishment rating scale."' 34 Problems with awards arise because jurors
have difficulty understanding how the severity ratings they assess trans-
late into dollar figures. 35 Even experts have difficulty agreeing on what
punitive damage dollar figure will adequately punish a reprehensible de-
fendant.36 This inability to easily decide on punitive damage amounts
31 See, e.g., Mogin, supra note 25, at 221.
32 Schkade et al., supra note 29, at 1173.
33 See, e.g., id.
34 See id. at 1169.
35 See PATRICK ATIYAH, THE DAMAGEs LO~rERY 143-50 (1997).
36 See Schkade et al., supra note 29, at 1145.
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can lead to juries arbitrarily choosing a figure, which occasionally results
in a shockingly large award. 37 These awards then become dubiously
characterized as outlier verdicts. 38 Deliberations may also cause
problems because jurors lack the ability to adequately differentiate be-
tween compensatory damages and punitive damages. This inability to
differentiate between the two types of damages can cause "leakage" be-
tween the two awards. 39
A second factor that may lead to the occasional outlier verdict in-
volves jury confusion about how to assess a dollar figure to effectuate
optimal deterrence. 40 Optimal deterrence theory posits that punitive
damages close the gap between the compensatory damages awarded and
the amount of damages needed to deter future repetition of harmful be-
havior.41 Jury instructions explain the different purposes served by
awarding compensatory damages and punitive damages, but they often
fail to provide guidance on how jurors should approach the different
types of awards.42 Even if courts did provide adequate instructions on
how to address optimal deterrence, the risk would remain that jurors
would not follow the instructions because ordinary people do not think in
terms of optimal deterrence. 43 In addition, the large punitive damage
awards reported in the media influence jurors' decisions."a
Another factor that deleteriously impacts the ability of juries to con-
sistently award appropriate punitive damages involves the jury's
penchant for presuming that defendants had more ex ante knowledge
than they actually did.45 Because of poor jury instructions, a poor expla-
nation by defense counsel, or a decision to disregard the jury instructions
received, jurors sometimes use a post-event reference point to assess the
defendant's pre-event knowledge. 46 This use of hindsight often makes a
juror believe that a much higher degree of care was warranted than "one
based on the actual imperfect pre-[event] state of knowledge. '47 Al-
though defendants may have reasonably arrived at their ultimate decision
37 See id. at 1144-45.
38 See id.
39 See Michelle Chemikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror As-
sessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & Hum, BEHAV. 313, 315-16
(1999).
40 Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 108.
41 Id. at 130.
42 See, e.g., Edith Greene et al., The Effects of Limiting Punitive Damage Awards, 25
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 217, 223 (2001).
43 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
237, 250 (2000).
44 Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 108.
45 E.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Perform-
ance As a Risk Manager, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 901, 914 (1998).
46 See id.
47 See id.
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prior to the event, jurors who review a defendant's decision years later-
when the case actually comes to trial-may see the defendant as having
acted on nothing more than a "wild hunch."'48 Presuming more knowl-
edge than the defendant's actual pre-event knowledge tends to sway ju-
ries toward increasing their culpability ratings for the defendant's
action.49 This tendency exists because jurors assign greater culpability to
defendants who acted with more pre-event knowledge than they do to
defendants who acted with less pre-event knowledge. 50
A fourth factor that may exert an upward influence on juries' puni-
tive damage verdicts involves the media's coverage of the American civil
justice system. Litigation that results in very large punitive damages
often garners significant media attention, and verdicts like the $2.7 mil-
lion McDonald's hot coffee award and the $5 billion Exxon Valdez oil
spill award have become a part of popular culture.51 Professor Jennifer
Robbennolt explains:
[I]t is likely that cases that result in large punitive dam-
age awards are more available in memory and are called
to mind more easily because they are reported more fre-
quently in the media than are other cases. Media reports
of plaintiffs winning large punitive damages awards may
inform jurors' judgments of the appropriate range of re-
covery in subsequent cases. If jurors use the cases that
are available in memory as benchmarks, larger damages
awards might result.5 2
Each of these factors may help explain the reasons that juries return
an occasional outlier verdict. Sometimes an individual factor may cause
the result, and other times the result may stem from a combination of
factors. While outliers may not be as prevalent as many think, 53 occa-
sionally a jury verdict deviates so substantially from the typical punitive-
to-compensatory ratio in similar cases that one cannot characterize the
punitive damages award as anything other than excessive. Typically, the
system has relied upon trial and appellate courts to exercise their powers
of remittitur to adjust the award downward, but those courts do not al-
ways opt to exercise such powers. It is for this reason that the U. S.
Supreme Court stepped in.
48 Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
Cm. L. REV. 571, 621 (1998).
49 E.g., Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 45, at 914.
50 See id.
51 Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 104.
52 Id. at 127.
53 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 293 (2006).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. SUPREME COURT PUNITIVE DAMAGES
CAP JURISPRUDENCE
Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court started to
provide some general guidance as to the constitutionality of enormous
and seemingly excessive punitive damage awards that survived appellate
remittitur review. In determining whether to strike down an award as
grossly excessive, the Court applied a reasonableness test to two separate
cases.54 The Court chose to uphold the awards in both cases, despite one
of the cases presenting an award in which the punitive-to-compensatory
ratio was 526:1. 55
In 1996, the Court actually invoked a new strain of substantive due
process analysis to strike down a punitive damage award as grossly ex-
cessive in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.56 In striking down the
$4 million punitive damages verdict,5 7 the Court promulgated a new in-
quiry that required both an identification of the state interest furthered by
the punitive award58 and an inquiry into whether the award proportion-
ally furthered the legitimate state interest.59 The Court's discussion of
proportionality revolved around three guideposts: (1) the degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant's acts or omissions, (2) the disparity between
the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive dam-
ages awarded, and (3) the difference between the particular remedy
awarded and the civil penalties imposed in analogous cases. 60
Another seven years passed before the Court refined its punitive
damages-due process analysis. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
54 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 443 (1993) (holding that "a
general concern of reasonableness properly enters into the constitutional analysis."); Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (holding that "[allthough a mathematical bright
line cannot be drawn between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unac-
ceptable that would fit every case, general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance
from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus.").
55 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
56 See generally 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that the $2 million punitive damages
award is grossly excessive, and therefore exceeds the constitutional limit). The Court did,
however, strike down a punitive damage award two years earlier in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 435 (1994). The majority reached this decision, however, because the
state court system in Oregon disallowed appellate reversal of a punitive damage award in
which the defendant's sole basis for a new trial or reversal request stemmed from the amount
of punitive damages awarded. Id. at 426-27. Consequently, the procedure, rather than the
award itself, grounded the Oberg Court's holding. Id. at 434-35.
57 To support this claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff showed that BMW had a
nationwide policy of not disclosing to consumers any pre-sale repairs made on vehicles, which
resulted in their portraying 983 refinished cars as new between 1983 and the trial date. Gore,
517 U.S. at 564.
58 Id. at 568.
59 Id. at 596-97 (Breyer, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 574-75.
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ance Co. v. Campbell,61 the Court struck down a Utah jury's $145 mil-
lion punitive damage award as grossly excessive in light of the
accompanying $1 million compensatory damage award.62 Applying the
Gore guideposts, the State Farm Court focused primarily on the puni-
tive-to-compensatory damage award ratio.63 Without drawing the line at
any specific ratio, the Court declared, "Single-digit multipliers are more
likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals
of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in the range of 500
to 1, or, in this case, of 145 to 1.' 64 Even though the Court refused to
draw a bright line ratio rule, the Court took a step closer in that direction
by using the 145 to 1 ratio as "clear evidence" that the award lacked
proportionality. 65 The Court went so far as to say that "[Flew awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages . . . will satisfy due process." 66
In 2008, the Court had an opportunity to refine its ratio-cap analysis
when the Exxon case finally came before it.67 It is important to note the
case's procedural posture. Exxon presented a question of first impression
regarding the extent to which maritime law allows an award of punitive
damages. 68 In State Farm and Gore, the Court had to determine whether
the awards violated the defendants' rights to due process; however, in
Exxon the Court did not conduct any due process analysis, but rather set
the punitive-to-compensatory damage award ratio at 1:1 as the federal
common law standard for maritime claims.69 As such, the opinion pro-
vides much deeper insight into the justices' views because constitutional
analysis did not constrain the way in which they could express their
views.70 Additionally, this case marked the first time in which Chief
Justice Roberts voted on the punitive damage ratio-cap issue.7'
61 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
62 Id. at 429.
63 See id. at 425-26.
64 Id. at 425.
65 See id.
66 Id.
67 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2611 (2008).
68 Id. at 2619.
69 Id. at 2633; compare Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding that a punitive damage
award that substantially outweighs the compensatory damages is excessive and violative of
due process), and Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (holding that a "grossly excessive"
punitive damages award violates constitutional due process), with Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626
(noting that "[tloday's enquiry differs from due process review because the case arises under
federal maritime jurisdiction, and we are reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime
law, rather than the outer limit allowed by due process.").
70 Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
71 id. at 2611. Unfortunately, Justice Alito took no part in deciding the case, so his
views remain unknown. Id.
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Ultimately, in a 6-3 opinion, the Court held that a 1:1 punitive-to-
compensatory award ratio-cap should govern federal maritime cases, 72
but the reasoning that the Court used in reaching this conclusion could
easily extend to all federal common law cases. The Exxon majority ap-
provingly cited a study, performed by Professor Theodore Eisenberg and
his colleagues, that found a median punitive-to-compensatory damage
award ratio of 0.62:1 in jury trials and a 0.66:1 ratio in bench trials.73
This study concluded that the similarity in award rates probably meant
that judges and juries reach similar conclusions, and the slight difference
may only reflect a tendency of defendants to route punitive award cases
to judges rather than juries, who are perceived as more punitive damage
award-friendly. 74 The Court also cited a study, performed by Neil Vid-
mar and Mary Rose that analyzed civil cases in Florida state courts be-
tween 1989 and 1998. 75 This study found a median ratio of 0.67:1 in
cases with punitive damage awards. 76
Drawing on such empirical evidence, the Court concluded that ju-
ries do award punitive damages somewhat consistently, but that "stark
unpredictability of punitive awards" marred the system.77 Noting that
the Eisenberg study's finding of a mean ratio of 0.62:1 also found a mean
ratio of 2.90:1 with a standard deviation of 13.81,78 Justice Souter's ma-
jority opinion asserted that "[t]he spread in state civil trials is great, and
the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the
corresponding compensatories. ' 79 In an attempt to reduce unpredictabil-
ity, the Court decided that a 1:1 ratio should cap the amount of punitive
damages that a jury could award in maritime cases. 80 Again, this empiri-
cally-based reasoning could drive the extension of a 1:1 cap into other
areas of federal law, which, as Part III will argue, would be a positive
development in the law of punitive damages.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW
Professor George L. Priest, a commentator who writes frequently on
tort reform, argued, "What is needed for punitive damages reform is a
prudential judgment of the appropriate cap or limit to punitive damages
that will allow some room for punishing egregious behavior but constrain
72 See id. at 2633.
73 Id. at 2625 & n.14.
74 Eisenberg et al., supra note 53, at 293.
75 Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
76 Neil Vidmar & Mary Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In Terrorem and
in Reality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487, 492 (2001).
77 Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
78 Eisenberg et al., supra note 53, at 269.
79 Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
80 Id. at 2633.
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the deleterious effects of unlimited punitive damages judgments on con-
sumers. '81 This Note proposes to reform punitive damage awards in a
way that comports with Professor Priest's view of how the system should
change. Part A of this section will provide background information
about capping punitive damages. Part B will argue that extending the
Exxon 1:1 cap would appropriately limit punitive damages. Part C will
propose that juries should have discretion to exceed the 1:1 cap for par-
ticularly egregious cases, but only if the plaintiff can carry a two-part
heightened standard of proof.
A. Background Information on Capping Punitive Damages
The push for a cap on punitive damage awards did not start with the
U.S. Supreme Court. Proponents of tort reform have been waging the
battle for a cap on punitive damages for over a decade in the state legisla-
tures. The North Carolina82 and Texas 83 state legislatures passed reform
measures in 1995. Numerous other states have followed sUit. 84 States
generally have chosen to cap punitive damages in one of three ways.
One group of states, which includes Georgia, caps punitive damages at
an absolute dollar amount, usually between $250,000 and $350,000.85 A
second group of states, which includes Colorado, Connecticut, and Penn-
sylvania, uses punitive-to-compensatory damage ratio caps to impose
ceilings on punitive damage awards, like the U.S. Supreme Court did in
Exxon.86 The third group of states, which includes Alabama, Alaska,
Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas, uses a hybrid of the two systems. 87
The imposition of such caps has spawned a significant group of de-
tractors. 88 Some argue that caps unreasonably treat all defendants the
same, making no exceptions for defendants who have behaved in a par-
81 Priest, supra note 1, at 839.
82 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § ID-25 (2007). The reform limits the award of punitive dam-
ages in most actions to the greater of $250,000 or three times the award of compensatory
damages. Id.
83 See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon 2009). The statute limits
punitive damage awards for most actions to the greater of $200,000 or twice the award of
economic damages plus non-economic damages, up to $750,000. Id.
84 Jonathon Klick & Catherine Sharkey, What Drives the Passage of Damage Caps? 2
(Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-09), available at http://ssm.coml
abstract= 1342535.
85 Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 169 n.308. Some states allow awards above the cap if
they involve special claims set out by statute. Id. Georgia, for example, allows punitive dam-
age awards greater than $250,000 if the harm results from product liability or substance abuse.
Id.
86 Id. at 169 n.309. Colorado uses a 1:1 ratio. Id. Connecticut uses a 2:1 ratio. Id.
Pennsylvania generally uses a 2:1 ratio. Id.
87 See id. at 169 n.310.
88 See id. at 169-70.
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ticularly egregious manner.89 Others argue that in some cases caps with-
hold from juries the tools needed to effectuate optimal deterrence, one of
the two reasons that punitive damages are part of the system in the first
place.90 They argue that punitive damage caps provide defendants with
the ability to calculate the maximum liability that could result if they
engage in particular types of misconduct. This incentivizes defendants to
proceed with harmful behavior if the profits derived exceed the resulting
compensatory payouts.91 A third common argument found in the litera-
ture theorizes that caps paradoxically act as an "anchoring" force that
increases the typical jury's punitive damages award.92
B. Positive Implications of Extending the 1:1 Exxon Cap to Other
Areas of the Law
Implementing a cap based on the Exxon 1:1 ratio will likely exert a
positive influence on the American civil justice system, while affecting
only a limited number of cases. The Eisenberg study provided empirical
data that the median ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages in jury
trials is 0.62:1.93 Even using the 0.67:1 median found by the Vidmar and
Rose study, 94 a 1:1 ratio provides considerable room for a jury to exer-
cise its discretion and to exceed the punitive-to-compensatory ratio that
the median jury would impose. A 1:1 ratio-cap permits a jury to exceed
the median ratio by over 50%. Most juries would not feel the pressure of
the cap because most juries do not even approach the 1:1 ratio. This fact
can be inferred from the disparity between the Eisenberg study's 0.66
median ratio and the 2.90 mean ratio. A rudimentary understanding of
statistics indicates that this disparity between the mean and median re-
89 See, e.g., Thomas M. Melscheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive
Damages: Providing Meaningful Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REV. 329, 347-48 (1994).
Justice Ginsburg falls into this category, as evidenced by her dissent in Exxon, in which she
questioned whether the Court would increase the ratio for a defendant who acted in a more
blameworthy manner than did Exxon. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2639
(2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The 1:1 ratio is good for this case, the Court believes,
because Exxon's conduct ranked on the low end of the blameworthiness scale: Exxon was not
seeking 'to augment profit' nor did it act 'with a purpose to injure.' What ratio will the Court
set for defendants who acted maliciously or in pursuit of financial gain? Should the magnitude
of the risk increase the ratio and, if so, by how much?").
90 See, e.g., Jacqueline Perczek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and Fair-
ness: A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 825, 865-66 (1993).
91 See id.
92 Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 171-73. Robbennolt and Studebaker successfully
showed that mock juries operating under the instruction of a cap consistently returned higher
awards than did mock juries that had the freedom to choose any award of their own volition.
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The
Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 J.L. & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 359, 361, 364-66 (1999).
93 Eisenberg et al., supra note 53, at 269.
94 Vidmar & Rose, supra note 76.
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suits from the majority of awards being heavily skewed toward a lower
ratio. Thus, the cap would constrain the discernible outlier verdicts that
drive the mean ratio significantly higher than the median ratio. Without
such a cap, the Exxon Court's noted fears about unpredictability present a
potential hazard for litigants trying to navigate the unwieldy American
civil litigation system.
Even if, as some commentators argue, the empirical evidence does
not bear out the fact that verdicts actually are highly unpredictable, 9 5 the
media likely fosters this perception, and the perception alone likely hin-
ders the settlement process. For example, Jeffrey Rachlinski argues that
those who subscribe to law and economics theory assume that a litigant
will settle only when the settlement's value exceeds the expected cost of
continuing to litigate.96 Rachlinski, however, points to empirical re-
search performed in the field of cognitive behavioral psychology that
suggests decision makers contemplating gains tend toward risk aversion,
while decision makers contemplating losses tend toward risk-seeking be-
havior.97 This behavioral phenomenon, he argues, carries over into the
realm of litigation, where plaintiffs tend toward settlement because they
are risk-averse, and defendants tend toward taking their chances at trial
because they are risk-seeking and settlement constitutes a sure loss.98
Defendants facing the prospect of punitive damages must use a dif-
ferent calculus than defendants who only face the prospect of compensa-
tory damages. Insurance policies often do not cover punitive damage
awards, and sometimes an award of punitive damages abrogates the com-
pany's obligation to pay the compensatory award portion.99 Addition-
ally, punitive damages have single-handedly forced profitable businesses
into immediate bankruptcy. 10° For these reasons punitive damages can
act as a type of "corporate capital punishment."10 1 These factors likely
result in defendants proceeding in a more risk-averse manner than they
would if they only faced compensatory damages. However, the 1:1 ra-
tio-cap would mitigate these factors because it would enable a defendant
to predict the maximum loss possible. Without the fear of a jury re-
turning a figure grossly exceeding anything the defendant had contem-
plated at the outset of litigation, a defendant may zealously litigate
against frivolous claims.
95 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 53, at 290-93.
96 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses & The Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113, 117 (1996).
97 Id. at 119.
98 Id. at 129.
99 Symposium, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1393, 1414 (1993).
100 Id. at 1414-15.
101 Id. at 1415.
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The possibility of substantial punitive damages almost certainly
changes the behavior on both sides of the dispute. News reports about
juries returning enormous punitive damage awards may cause plaintiffs
to "shoot for the moon" more frequently than they otherwise would, and
thus settle less often.10 2 A 1:1 cap would encourage settlement by sub-
duing the urges of meritorious plaintiffs to litigate zealously in hopes of
receiving a windfall from an enormous punitive damage award. Because
defendants would no longer have to fear unimaginably high punitive
damage awards and would therefore be more likely to litigate than settle,
the cap would weed out those plaintiffs who bring frivolous claims look-
ing for easy cash from a quick settlement.
Some evidence about juror attitudes and limitations also suggests
that an occasional outlier verdict should be expected. Product liability
cases, for example, often present necessarily complex testimony that the
typical juror finds dull.10 3 The complexity of such technical evidence
often bores-jurors or leaves them confused." 4 To make matters worse,
these cases have a tendency to drag on for weeks or months at a time,
with a plethora of expert witnesses being called to testify during the
course of the trial. 105 While studies have shown that many jurors "begin
with strong assumptions about unjustified lawsuits and concern for a liti-
gation explosion," studies have also shown that seriously injured plain-
tiffs may tug at jurors' heartstrings. 10 6 When a plaintiff testifies about
the event that caused the injury, the witness is very likely to have the
jury's undivided attention. The nature of such complex trials makes this
testimony probably the least important of any, but the most likely to be
remembered during deliberation. Furthermore, while researchers disa-
gree over the extent to which jurors tend to have a natural dislike for
large corporations, 10 7 most would agree that jurors tend to hold corpora-
102 See Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill:
Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 612 (1985).
103 See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers
of Defective Products, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1982).
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANs, AMERICAN JURiEs: THE VERDICT 274 (2007). Pro-
fessor Jennifer Robbennolt also conducted a study in which she reviewed seventy-five previ-
ous studies of this phenomenon and, concluded that people tend to assign greater responsibility
for the happening of an accident when the plaintiff has suffered serious harm as compared to
less serious harm. Id.
107 Compare Owen, supra note 103, at 11 ("[Jlurors have a natural sympathy for a seri-
ously injured person that is reinforced when the defendant is a manufacturer, for many people
are hostile toward major institutions in general and 'big business' in particular. Some jurors
may thus be tempted to simplistic explanations of the issue.., that comport with their precon-
ceived notions of manufacturers' oppression of consumers."), with VIDMAR & HANs, supra
note 106, at 278 ("[J]urors seem to use the same basic template to assess individual and corpo-
rate responsibility .... ").
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tions to a higher standard for their conduct, which puts corporations at a
disadvantage in the civil justice system. 10 8 Some feel that the media fu-
els a negative bias toward institutions and big business by portraying
such entities as "foolish, greedy, or criminal" and "as the embodiment of
all that is wrong with America."' 10 9
These problems may not be confined to product liability cases ei-
ther. Similar problems may also arise during trademark infringement
and patent infringement cases because those cases frequently involve
both technical testimony and corporate defendants. The tendency to hold
corporations to a higher standard may arise in any and all suits by indi-
viduals against big business. 110 Trial tools such as jury instructions and
voir dire seem unlikely to completely remove such tendencies from the
jury pool.
C. Proposing Heightened Standards of Proof for Awards Exceeding
the 1:1 Cap
Concerns about handcuffing the jury with a rigid 1:1 ratio-cap are
well-founded. After all, the jury's primary function is to serve as a di-
verse and representative cross section of the community,"' and a strict
cap may obstruct it from fully relaying the community's sentiments.
There can, however, be a middle ground between imposing a ratio-cap
and maintaining the jury's province over expressing the community's
sentiments. Finding this middle ground can be accomplished by height-
ening the standards of proof necessary for a plaintiff who wants the jury
to award punitive damages in excess of the 1:1 ratio. The proposed
heightened standards would have two components. First, the plaintiff
would have to prove that the defendant acted with an evil mind. Second,
the plaintiff would have to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Ginsburg, one of three dissenting justices in the Exxon decision,
criticized the majority's 1:1 ratio-cap due to the majority's lack of gui-
dance on when a jury can deviate from that 1:1 cap. 1 2 These heightened
proof standards address Justice Ginsburg's criticism head-on.
The evil mind standard comes from a line of precedent arising out
of Arizona state common law. Arizona applies the evil mind standard to
every punitive damage claim. 13 The Supreme Court of Arizona adopted
and delineated the contours of this standard in its 1986 decision in Linthi-
108 See VtDMAR & HANs, supra note 106, at 279.
109 Owen, supra note 103, at 11 n.56.
11O VIDMAR & HANs, supra note 106, at 279.
''' Id. at 74-76.
112 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2639 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113 Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 680 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc)
(holding that a jury must find evidence that the defendant manifested an evil mind before the
jury can award punitive damages).
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cum v. Nationwide Life Insurance Company.' 14 The Linthicum Court ad-
monished lower courts to focus their inquiry on the mental state of
defendants facing punitive damage claims. 115 Under the evil mind test,
the mere commission of a tort is not enough to warrant punitive dam-
ages. 1 6 Although a jury may infer an evil mind through circumstantial
evidence, the defendant must have acted outrageously or in a manner that
"create[d] a tremendous risk of harm to others," in addition to having
either acted with intent or with a conscious disregard of an unjustifiably
substantial risk of significant harm to the plaintiff.1 17 In short, the plain-
tiff must show that "the defendant's evil hand was guided by an evil
mind."118
The second standard that should control revolves around the stan-
dard of proof. Whenever a plaintiff requests a punitive damage award
exceeding the 1:1 cap, the plaintiff should have to prove the evil mind
element beyond a reasonable doubt. The beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, applied primarily in criminal cases, is the highest standard used
in American courts. Colorado, however, decided to try reining in exces-
sive punitive damage awards by enacting a statute providing that for all
claims of punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove the claim beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 19 To impose a jury's recommended punitive damage
award, Oklahoma state law requires both the jury to find by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant acted intentionally and the court
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted intentionally
and threatened human life.120
Of course, the argument that the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard would materially impact the awarding of punitive damages assumes
that juries can capably differentiate between different standards of proof.
Although juries report struggling with the terms typically employed to
describe burdens of proof,12' research suggests that jurors generally un-
derstand the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and when they misun-
derstand it, it is because they interpret it as a higher standard than that
which beyond a reasonable doubt actually intends to require. 122
114 See id. at 675.
115 Id. at 679.
116 Id. (citing Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (Ariz. 1986)).
117 Id. at 679-80.
118 Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578. The Supreme Court of Missouri also cited Rawlings and
the quote "[T]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant's evil hand was guided by an evil
mind" as an accurate characterization of its own law of punitive damages. Burmett v. Griffith,
769 S.W.2d 780, 787 (Mo. 1989).
119 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2003).
120 OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9.1 (2009).
121 ViDMAR & HANs, supra note 106, at 129.
122 See id. at 161. Research by Geoffrey Kramer and Dorean Koening found that jurors
tend to equate "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" with 100 percent certainty. Geoffrey
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The O.J. Simpson case provides anecdotal evidence that juries can
competently differentiate between the standards. 123 When the state of
California tried Simpson for double murder, the jury returned a verdict
finding Simpson not guilty. 124 After the verdict, one of the alleged vic-
tim's fathers filed suit against Simpson for the wrongful death of his
daughter. 125 In the wrongful death civil case, which applied a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff,
finding it more likely than not that Simpson killed his ex-wife, Nicole
Brown Simpson, and Ron Goldman. 126 On its face, these divergent ver-
dicts suggest that juries may have the capacity to distinguish between
different burdens of proof.' 27
Because juries seem to possess this competency, requiring proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with an evil mind for
awards exceeding the 1:1 cap would vastly improve the punitive dam-
ages system that currently exists in the United States. This heightened
burden of proof standard would serve three functions. It would advance
(1) the goal of retribution, (2) the goal of optimal deterrence, and (3) the
goal of increasing the legitimacy of large punitive damage awards.
The evil mind standard advances the goal of retribution, one of two
purposes that theoretically underpin the imposition of punitive damages.
If a plaintiff provides enough evidence to meet the heightened standard,
it allows a jury to exceed the 1:1 ratio-cap for tortious actions that spark
the community's disdain. The evil mind standard ensures that the defen-
dant facing punitive damages acted more egregiously than a defendant
who merely acted negligently or recklessly. 128 By requiring such a high
and specific mental state, the test reduces the likelihood that a jury will
punish a corporation solely because the jury believes the corporation
should comply with a higher standard. 129 The test also would afford de-
fendants greater protection from punitive damage awards that result from
the jury finding higher levels of culpability when a plaintiff has suffered
serious injury from an act of negligence. 130
Kramer & Dorean Koening, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the
Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. JL. REFORM 401, 414-15
(1990).
123 VIDMAR & HANs, supra note 106, 196-97.
124 Id. at 196.
125 Id. at 196-97.
126 Id. at 197.
127 See id. Of course, it is important to note that different juries sat for the different trials.
Id. As a result, other factors could possibly explain the different results. These factors include
different attitudes, different presentations of the evidence, the judges diverging on the admis-
sion of questionable evidence, and possible bias to the civil jurors from the extensive media
circus that the criminal case triggered.
128 See Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 680 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
129 See supra Part II.B.
130 See id.
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The proposed heightened proof standard for awards exceeding the
1:1 cap better advances the goal of retribution than does setting either an
absolute maximum dollar amount on punitive damages or an absolute
ratio ceiling on punitive-to-compensatory awards, as was done by a
group of states.131 One concern that grounded the Exxon dissents by
Justices Stevens and Breyer relates to this issue. Stevens argued, "[T]he
jury could reasonably have given expression to its 'moral condemnation'
of Exxon's conduct in the form of this [17.4:1 punitive-to-compensatory]
award." ' 32 Breyer similarly explained, "The jury could reasonably have
believed that Exxon knowingly allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly
to pilot a vessel filled with millions of gallons of oil through waters that
provided the livelihood for the many plaintiffs in this case."'
133
Under the strict 1:1 ratio-cap adopted by the Exxon majority, the
most punishment that the jury could dole out against Exxon was the $287
million that matched the compensatory damages. But if the proposed
evil mind standard applied, the jury would have more discretion in
awarding a larger amount of damages if the plaintiffs could establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Exxon acted with an evil mind. The
heavy burden that the plaintiff would bear seems to make it likely that
under the proposed rule, the 1:1 ratio-cap would govern because Exxon
probably neither intended nor would have knowingly allowed its se-
verely inebriated captain to navigate around an underwater reef. Yet, the
possibility exists that the plaintiffs could have proven these facts, thus
satisfying the concerns harbored by Stevens and Breyer, and suggesting
that reaching a middle ground in this controversial area of the law is
possible.
The heightened proof standards also advance the goal of optimal
deterrence, the second theoretical underpinning of punitive damages law.
Optimal deterrence is the notion that punitive damages serve the purpose
of closing the gap between the compensatory damages awarded and the
amount of damages needed to deter future repetition of harmful behav-
ior.' 34 If a defendant calculated that its tortious conduct would result in
100 deaths per year and that the resulting compensatory damages would
amount to $500,000 per death, it could then determine whether the prof-
its resulting from its tortious act would exceed the aggregate payout for
the deaths. Unless the law closes the gap to make the tortious conduct
unprofitable, the defendant could proceed profitably with its egregious
behavior as long as the behavior grossed the defendant more than $50
131 See supra Part H.A.
132 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2638 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134 See Robbennolt, supra note 15, at 130.
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million per year. 13 5 On the other hand, an exceedingly large award can
result in over-deterrence. When the law over-deters, individuals or enti-
ties operate inefficiently to avoid accidents. 136 When a jury awards an
excessive punitive damage award, it over-deters others from engaging in
similar conduct, which may result in inefficient accident avoidance.1 37
The 1:1 ratio-cap strives to cut down on over-deterrence by reduc-
ing excessive punitive damages. State systems that use absolute dollar
figure ceilings or absolute punitive-to-compensatory damage award ratio
caps attempt to achieve the same goal. Only focusing on reducing over-
deterrence may, however, result in under-deterrence. It is for this reason
that absolute dollar figure ceilings or absolute ratio-caps do not accom-
plish the goal of optimal deterrence as well as the proposed 1:1 ratio-cap
with an option for deviation would.
This very criticism drives much of Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Ex-
xon. The rigidity of a 1:1 ratio-cap concerned her a great deal because it
gave no guidance for when and if lower courts could deviate from the 1:1
standard. 138 If the Exxon Court's new rule categorically barred deviation
from the 1:1 rule, then cases might arise where the jury will lack the
tools necessary to adequately deter a tortfeasor. Indicating her concern
about this point, Justice Ginsburg questioned, "What ratio will the Court
set for defendants who acted maliciously or in pursuit of financial
gain?" 139 This concern-along the lines of the dissents by Stevens and
Breyer-might also be a concern that juries lack the tools necessary to
carry out retribution. The proposed heightened proof standards would
alleviate this unease in the same way it alleviated the concerns of her two
dissenting colleagues.
The third goal achieved by the evil mind standard is that it would
increase the public's belief in the legitimacy of large punitive damages
awards. Achievement of this goal requires improving the accuracy of
jury verdicts. If punitive damage awards do suffer from significant vari-
ability, then the cap should rein in the outliers because few cases will
likely provide sufficient evidence to prove the evil mind standard beyond
a reasonable doubt. Cases in which the jury does find that the plaintiff
met such an exacting standard allow the legal system and the public to
place more faith in the award's accuracy because the defendant's behav-
ior must have been egregious, and the proof of such behavior must have
been substantial. After all, research demonstrates that juries understand
135 See Sunstein et al., supra note 44, at 238 n.4.
136 See Carl Shapiro, Symposium on the Economics of Liability, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5
(1991).
137 Cf id.
138 See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139 See id.
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the exacting standard that beyond a reasonable doubt entails.140 As Neil
Vidmar and Valerie Hans explain,
Research shows us that jury acquittals with which the
trial judge disagrees are more likely to occur than jury
convictions with which the trial judge disagrees. When
the jury diverges from the legal expert, it is in the direc-
tion of acquitting rather than convicting .... The jury's
tendency to acquit is consistent with the adage that it is
better to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict one
innocent person. 141
Even if the Eisenberg study correctly claims that punitive damages
awards are somewhat predictable, the evil mind standard should increase
the public's confidence that the defendant behaved egregiously, and the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard should increase the public's confi-
dence that the jury returned an accurate verdict.
The evil mind standard is superior to a system that strictly relies on
the use of remittitur by trial courts and appellate courts for several rea-
sons. One major problem with permitting an appellate court to use re-
mittitur to reduce a verdict that appears to be an outlier is that it makes
the trial judge or appellate court a kind of "super fact-finder. ' 142 Jurors
have the unique experience of hearing live testimony and seeing wit-
nesses' demeanors. Appellate courts, on the other hand, are not nearly as
well-equipped as a jury to make decisions on whether an award makes
sense in light of the evidence presented at trial because the appellate
court must rely strictly upon the trial transcript. 143 When the trial court
judge reduces the award, "the trial judge becomes a jury of one."' 144 Ex-
cept for the most egregious cases of excessiveness, trial and appellate
judges have no greater capacity to improve upon the results returned by
juries. 145 Consequently, the proposed heightened standards keep deci-
sions about an award's appropriateness in the hands of the individuals
with the greatest amount of information-the jury.
140 ViMmAR & HANS, supra note 106, at 196. Admittedly, this tendency by jurors may not
result directly, solely, or even at all from the charge of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt," but
rather from the jurors understanding that their decision will determine whether a person will
spend years in a penitentiary and suffer severe consequences, even after release from prison.
But it also suggests that jurors may associate more seriousness with the charge of "beyond a
reasonable doubt" even in a civil context because of their association with the phrase in the
criminal context.
141 Id.
142 See Firestone v. Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985)
(abolishing the use of remittitur in Missouri).
143 See id. (citing Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 27 S.W. 453, 458-66 (Mo. 1894)).
144 Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the Federal Courts: An Evaluation
with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 157, 213 (1987-88).
145 See MacQueen & Woodworth, supra note 28, at 1120.
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The heightened standards of proof would also improve upon a sys-
tem that relies solely on remittitur by improving judicial economy and
efficiency. Some critics view remittitur as a procedure that "encourages
waste of judicial time and energy." 14 6 When a jury returns an award, a
defendant has nothing to lose by filing a motion for remittitur. 147 Trial
courts and appellate courts then have to rule on these motions. 148 The
defendant might lose on its request. If this happens, then the status quo,
from the defendant's perspective, has not changed. 149 If the defendant
wins, however, the plaintiff will have to choose between a new trial and
accepting the reduced damages award proposed by the court. 150 In prac-
tice, the plaintiff accepts the remittitur almost every time. 15 1 Addition-
ally, before the court returns its decision on the remittitur motion, it must
meticulously calculate the appropriate damages award, which will end up
wasted if the plaintiff selects a new trial instead. 152 The heightened
proof standard proposal, meanwhile, should improve judicial economy
because the more exacting standards of proof should inspire greater con-
fidence in judges reviewing awards for accuracy.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued for a tort reform measure that serves as a
compromise between those who advocate for a rigid fixed-ratio cap on
punitive damages and those who want to maintain the jury's ability to
represent community values. The proposal is two-part: (1) impose a 1:1
punitive-to-compensatory damages cap on punitive damage awards; and
(2) for cases in which the plaintiff requests a punitive damage award in
excess of the 1:1 ratio, allow the jury to exceed the cap only if the plain-
tiff can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with an
evil mind. This new two-part standard reduces the likelihood of outlier
verdicts, while still permitting juror discretion for those cases in which
egregious behavior by a defendant is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
These proposals perform what many think to be impossible-provide a
middle ground between punitive damage award caps and maintain the
integrity of the jury's province.
146 See, e.g., Sann, supra note 144, at 214-15.
147 See id. at 215.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See, e.g., Sann, supra note 144, at 215.
152 See id.
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